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STUDY
PROJECT

**AMERICA'S UNFOCUSED HUMANITARIAN
AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS:
IS ANYBODY IN CHARGE?
WHERE ARE WE GOING?**

BY

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United States Army

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The United States military is a crucial player in America's foreign assistance programs. Under the State Department's overall authority, and the United States Agency for International Development's management, armed forces assets provide educational, training, construction, and humanitarian services to a significant segment of the Third World. However, in today's underdeveloped Central and South American countries, it is difficult to see a significant return on our HCA investments. Smothering poverty still exists, and even though it appears that limited Democratic institutions are beginning to emerge, the economic and political forces which maintain poverty are still firmly in power. This paper examines why American political, economic, and military initiatives have not been more successful in focusing on, and then working to eradicate, the root causes of poverty instead of generally treating its symptoms. Also included are recommendations for organizational and structural changes which might facilitate removing the host nation oligopolies and oligarchies responsible for continuing the unfortunate status quo.

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HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS:
IS ANYBODY IN CHARGE? WHERE ARE WE GOING?**

by

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"Our weakness lies in this - that we have
never got down to an exact definition
of what we are seeking."
S.L.A. Marshall¹

INTRODUCTION

This paper is about our government's use of its armed forces to conduct Latin American humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs. It will examine how the United States has spent its foreign assistance and defense resources in this area, and what our return on that investment has been.

There are three distinct themes to this exploration. The first concerns America's past inability to accurately identify and attack the root causes of host nation poverty, and how we have traditionally dealt with the symptoms as opposed to problems of these countries. The second theme treats America's lack of political leadership and interagency operability in managing HCA programs. The third theme discusses what role, if any, America's military should play in future HCA activities.

PART A

CONCEPTS AND PHILOSOPHIES

1. Why the United States' Government Conducts Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs

At the macro level, the world's population can be divided into two categories, the *comfortable* and the *uncomfortable*. The comfortable can be identified as those who desire to maintain the economic, political, social, and military status quo primarily because they have constructed it to work for their benefit.

Members of the comfortable class all possess satisfactory but varying qualitative levels of:

- a. A safe place to live;
- b. Adequate nutrition;
- c. Available medical care;
- d. Employable skills;
- e. Secure jobs;
- f. The ability to acquire some of life's luxuries;
- g. Access to government's decision-making and benefit-bestowing mechanisms; and
- h. Reason to believe they and their children will be able to live out their lives without a significant reduction in stature.

The second world population category, the uncomfortable, is comprised of everybody else. The uncomfortable do not regularly possess any of the benefits listed above. As a result, they:

- a. Reject and/or are unable to assimilate the comfortable's values and conventions on life.
- b. Are not accurately identified by race, religion, nationality, gender, citizenship, or any other traditional classification the comfortable have created largely to distinguish themselves from the uncomfortable.
- c. Do not recognize or generally understand such theoretical concepts as sovereignty, property rights, jurisdictional borders, or the rule of law.
- d. Worry about survival and are unable to maintain a "hopeful" outlook on the world or their immediate future.

e. Think about the comfortable as being corrupt, and occasionally plan on how they can reverse the status quo, either peacefully or violently.

Alternatively, the comfortable rarely contemplate the uncomfortable, mainly because the uncomfortable are viewed as possessing no proximate economic, political, or physical threat. The comfortable understand how to make the system work for them and their progeny. The uncomfortable do not even have access to the system.

This comfortable vs. uncomfortable distinction is important to America's national interests because history occasionally matches the uncomfortable with some capricious event and charismatic leader capable of effecting changes which will be viewed by the comfortable as threatening their status.² History also demonstrates that when such threats materialize, the comfortable meet them with violent reactions which further polarize the parties, prolong the undesirable status quo, limit host nation development, and encourage further hemispheric turmoil which might ultimately involve the United States.³

At a minimum, allowing Latin America's comfortable vs. uncomfortable economic and political division to continue, effectively retards the region's overall development, thereby harming America's long term fiscal and security interests.⁴ Conceptually, America's HCA programs can be designed to maximize the uncomfortable's ability to improve their quality of life, while minimizing the comfortable's aversion to change. Appropriately

constructed and focused HCA programs will assist every segment of an underdeveloped country in realizing benefits from pluralistic governments, open market based economies, widespread development, and a significant reduction in social elitism.

2. The Genesis and Definition of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs

Beginning in the early 1960s, the United States and many Latin American governments began a series of nation assistance programs which were constructed to invest the uncomfortable in the comfortable's world by making economic, social, political, medical, and educational opportunities universally accessible.⁵ This concept identified what we now refer to as humanitarian and civic assistance programs.⁶ Joint Publication 1-02⁷ defines them as:

[A]ssistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code Title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by federal agencies or international organizations.

Army Field Manual 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*⁸, provides that HCA activities are:

a. Designed to assist Third World nations in rectifying the causes of local instability by improving their population's quality of life through basic construction and health care improvements.

b. Controlled by the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which must approve all operations.

c. Funded by Congress through specific set aside appropriations.

d. Not to be provided to any entity or individual engaged in military activities.

e. An interagency operation requiring the State Department, USAID, Department of Defense (DoD), local American Ambassadors, and Unified Commands to all play interlocking and mutually supportive roles using civilian, active, reserve, and national guard components.

Pragmatically, HCA activities can be divided into three components. The first concerns vertical and horizontal construction programs. Building roads, rehabilitating schools and medical treatment facilities, and other military exercise related construction fall into this category. The second component concerns the delivery of services to host nations. Included here are medical, dental, veterinary, and related assistance programs. The final component includes educational and intellectual support such as combined exercises, deployments for training, and personnel exchange programs.⁹

3. Fiscal and Programmatic Constraints on Hemispheric Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations

Although HCA has received wide notoriety within Latin America, it has always been limited in scope and funding. The 1987 Defense Authorization Act provided that between 1987 and 1991, government expenditures in HCA programs could not exceed \$16.4 million.¹⁰ JCS Exercise Related Construction (ERC) funds which are available

for projects under \$1 million, have averaged only \$7 million per year.¹¹

Since 1987, United States Southern Command has received at least 50% of all HCA and ERC funding.¹² Depending on events, Southern Command focused most of this money on Honduras, Bolivia, and Panama. During this period, as Latin American economic and political conditions failed to improve, the number of nation building programs increased from approximately 40 per year to over 200.¹³

Military efforts also include programs aimed at education and the creation of traditional democratic values. International Military Education and Training Programs (IMET) are increasingly directed at host nations' junior officers because they may be more receptive to implementing new economic, political, and military ideas.¹⁴

For example, the Secretary of the Army's Latin American Cooperation Fund (SALACF) enhances army-to-army relations through unit exchanges and familiarization visits. A large portion of this activity has concerned Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) between United States and Latin American military representatives.¹⁵ With our government's emphasis on human rights and military justice themes, the Army's Judge Advocate General Corps¹⁶ and the Surgeon General's Corps have recently conducted very successful educational programs which have attracted large numbers of relatively junior officers.¹⁷ Deployments for Training (DFTs), Mobil Training Teams (MTTs), and Personnel Exchange

Programs (PEPs) continue to serve similar ends. All have proven useful, particularly when a small United States' presence was politically desirable.¹⁸

4. The Ends, Ways, and Means¹⁹ of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance

In order to define HCA in traditional American strategic concepts, a modification²⁰ of the ends, ways, and means model is helpful. This tailored design asks four questions: (a) What is the character of HCA programs? (b) What is their desired end state? (c) What will help the United States achieve that end? (d) What will prevent us from achieving it?

a. *Character of the Activity.* As defined here, Latin American humanitarian and civic assistance initiatives should not involve any variant of host nation internal security support. Instead, HCA should be designed to economically, politically, medically, and educationally help local populations create effective tools for fighting the corruption and deprivation caused by their government's repressive policies. Conceptually, each program should be tied to the host nation's unique circumstances and individual desires. American help must be constructed based on what local representatives tell us they need, and then what we agree should be delivered. Our ability to listen here is as important as our ability to perform.

b. *Where we are going.* The United States' goals in Latin American HCA projects are to create enlightened, secure, pluralistic governments; comfortable populations; sound capitalistic economies; and ample markets for American products.²¹

Additionally, the new world order encourages us to abandon our past cold war HCA efforts to bolster weak or corrupt governments just because they were once willing to be aligned with us as opposed to the Soviet Union.²² History has given the United States another opportunity to reexamine its past practices and use HCA programs exclusively to economically benefit "underdeveloped populations," while providing new markets for American products.

Extending this logic even further demonstrates that America should not be concerned about the particular governmental form adopted by emerging Latin American governments (although some variant on democracy would be helpful). Our national interests, particularly in the Americas, reside in creating secure and friendly markets, not necessarily in transplanting Jeffersonian democracy.²³

c. *Tools available.* To succeed in this endeavor our nation assistance efforts require:

(1) Sufficient legal authorization to conduct meaningful, focused, and sustained HCA programs. Congressional appropriations and agency program initiatives must be linked to articulable long range goals aimed at eradicating the causes of poverty which will be consistently funded and meaningfully implemented.

(2) Astute national level political and military leadership able to accurately and consistently identify the causes of developing countries' problems as opposed to merely the symptoms of those problems.

(3) Effective American interagency policy creation, leadership, coordination, and accountability. America needs to abandon its ad hoc approach to HCA, and develop workable, focused, predicable systems.

d. *What can stop us.* We can only be defeated by intangibles: corruption, hidden agendas, inappropriately focused or constructed programs, and *sub rosa* agreements -- those things which are the most difficult to identify and correct. Effective American political leadership and governmental openness will go a long way to eliminating these problems.

5. Legal Impediments to Effective Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs

As mentioned above, virtually all nation assistance legislation comes from the cold war period when pluralistic Third World governments were luxuries our political leaders thought we could not afford to develop.²⁴ Unfortunately, many commentators believe that HCA programs are still mired in ideological evolutions of these cold war containment policies.²⁵ If they are correct, our existing philosophical approach to foreign assistance is tremendously counterproductive, unenlightened, and must be abandoned.²⁶

Perhaps the best example of such legislation is the Stevens Amendment.²⁷ Passed as a means for legitimizing effective but largely unauthorized Latin American civic assistance programs, Congress required all future similar activities to be done in connection with overseas military exercises.

As a result, the 20,000 or so active duty, reserve, and national guard troops passing through Southern Command each year on their way to Latin American exercises, are legally viewed as making the journey "to train, and nothing more."²⁸ However, when these "training missions" are viewed from the ground, it appears that they are either poorly conceived internal security operations, or mal-designed political and economic programs, rather than opportunities for our soldiers to develop military skills.²⁹ If this were not the case, it would be very difficult to justify the logistical, administrative, and political expenses required to train 20,000 soldiers under conditions which could be more easily and economically simulated in CONUS.

Interestingly, FM 100-20 links HCA, which it describes as "a mechanism by which United States military personnel and resources assist Third World populations by improving their quality of life," directly with operations other than war doctrine and United States military support to host nation internal security and counterinsurgency ventures.³⁰ This linkage is a serious foreign policy limitation because it binds new world order economic and political realities to cold war military goals. The strategy no longer fits the objectives, and the host nation populations we are attempting to benefit see the mismatch more clearly than ever.

6. Using Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs for Protecting America's Security

The United States' way of life is being threatened today more aggressively than at any time since the end of World War II.³¹ Everything which is important to us is under attack by hostile governments anxious to improve their own economic and political position at our expense.

What we as a nation have yet to internalize is that this threat is not military. Our opponents will not have to fire a shot at us, or land a soldier on our shores to eventually obtain what they desire. The battle is in the market place, in our factories, and in our schools. Effectively used, HCA can be another form of deterrence, like the Marshall Plan, but this time aimed at Third World economic and political failures.³²

Unfortunately, America is still unprepared³³ for this new *battlefield*, primarily because we are still fighting the last war, the last *military* threat. HCA, properly executed, is a way out of this historic American tendency. It is more than the functional equivalent of a new combat formation, a new weapon, or a new tactic. HCA is a new philosophical approach to a new category of conflict.

When the Western powers won the cold war, what they accomplished was not an end to hostilities, but a transformation of those hostilities into potential economic and political battles among what would otherwise be allies. HCA and its enhanced Latin American markets will improve our ability to compete in this new arena.³⁴

As Europe attempts to assemble itself into a single economic force centered on Germany, and Japan moves to consolidate the Pacific rim, the United States must at last look to the Western Hemisphere as containing its trading allies. Today, many of those allies are not competitive with the forces arrayed against them.³⁵ Nation assistance is the training vehicle necessary to develop their emergence as viable trading partners and sincere allied combatants in future economic hostilities.

This progress cannot be made if we continue to carry outdated ideology and regulatory baggage to the new challenge.³⁶ The cold war military threat has very little to do with the New World Order economic and political contests. Seen in this light, allowing nation building programs to remain embedded in past military internal security objectives and totally ineffective efforts at identifying a developing country's real problems, as apposed to its more readily satiated symptoms of these problems, is the functional equivalent of teaching horse cavalry tactics to the pre-World War II Command and General Staff College classes.

PART B

THE NEED FOR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN NATION ASSISTANCE ENDEAVORS

1. The Bureaucratic Maze

Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are controlled by the State Department. It maintains diplomatic relations with over 170 countries, and has more than 270 embassies, consulates, and missions throughout the world. In each embassy the Ambassador, as the "chief of mission," directs virtually all American HCA

initiatives. Host nation HCA is essentially his responsibility.¹⁷

Significant foreign policy decisions and actions contemplated by the Ambassador must initially be coordinated with relevant American agencies. These organizations, the Department of Defense or USAID for example, then conduct parallel staffing procedures within their respective headquarters. During this process, various aspects of the Ambassador's initiative must also be coordinated with applicable host nation agencies.

In many ways, each embassy and each host nation is a universe unto itself. Separated by time, distance, and emotional involvement, our overseas political and military organizations operate in a detached and often perceived autonomous manner. Dealing with unique host nation personalities, governments, histories, religious affiliations, economic shortcomings, and international rivalries leads the country team to sometimes assume that only they know what America's foreign policy and implementing procedures should be.

Clearly, with 270 separate diplomatic missions spread throughout an increasingly diverse and more complex world, conducting our nation's foreign policy and implementing its HCA programs require clear and effective national guidance.³⁸ However, the bureaucratic tendency under these circumstances has been to defer to the country team's judgement on how economic and political initiatives should be conducted. As a result, HCA programs do not directly benefit from an articulated and coordinated national level plan. More often, they are ad hoc efforts tied to both American

and host nation politics; not the foundational reasons for our involvement with the target country.³⁹

2. USAID's Lead Responsibilities for Economic and Humanitarian Assistance

It is important to recognize that with respect to the nation assistance and related military and civilian activities discussed here, the United States Agency for International Development has primacy. They administer these programs in more than 100 African, Asian, European, and Latin American countries.⁴⁰ USAID's charter is designed to:

a. Support economic and political reforms which will generate employment, promote broad-based and environmentally sound economic growth, while encouraging political freedom and healthy government practices;

b. Invest in host nation human development by providing support to voluntary family planning, child survival, health, education, and natural disaster relief programs.

c. Strengthen the institutions and infrastructure necessary for local governments to expand their economic base and the production of goods and services.⁴¹

USAID believes its programs advance United States foreign policy objectives because they promote democratic values while creating improved host nation economic conditions necessary to purchase American products. AID also funds technical assistance programs which train thousands of foreign students at American universities, and obtains business and non-governmental research support for these activities.⁴²

AID "assistance programs are administered through overseas missions, which have broad decision-making authority, and through specialized offices in Washington D.C."⁴³ USAID's jurisdiction over economic and political support to host nations is a vital component to understanding the United States military's supportive role, and for appreciating the administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms which must be coordinated for even the most rudimentary policy and implementation development.

Viewed programmatically, local changes to the manner in which HCA and nation assistance programs are being accomplished would require interagency coordination beginning with the country team (USAID, Embassy, and military officers at least), and ending with their respective national level supervisors. The gauntlet of diverse backgrounds, interests, and agency turf battles which must be negotiated to effectuate such changes, on the American side alone, makes timely and meaningful systemic direction, mid-course corrections, and uniform policy implementation difficult at best.

3. Long Standing Afflictions in Leading the System

The situation is exacerbated in Washington.⁴⁴ Bureaucratically, the State Department is responsible for all foreign policy programs and their implementation. To the extent USAID and DoD are involved in HCA activities, they operate pursuant to States' leadership.⁴⁵

Unfortunately, experience demonstrates that State is unable to perform its leadership function here. Formal delegations of Presidential authority and powerful Secretaries have been unable to

coordinate the Department's internal activities or its interagency responsibilities.⁴⁶

There are many reasons for this shortcoming, most beyond the Department's capacity to rectify. They include:

a. Vehement resistance from other governmental agencies which jealously protect their own jurisdiction, resources, and authority.

b. Parochial interests which require the State Department to become an advocate for positions it supports, rather than a neutral broker of other agencies' views.

c. Presidential uneasiness about the Department's loyalty, functional competence, and conservatism.

d. Criticism of State's analytical and reporting capabilities which many feel are based more on foreign service officer intuition than actual fact.

e. A perception that the Department is more concerned about maintaining good relations with host nation governments, than strongly advocating and enforcing American interests.

f. The Department's historical de-emphasis of management skills and the importance of managers, which has lead to ad hoc and uncoordinated programs.⁴⁷

The political environment discussed above does not lend itself to efficient and measured HCA program development or implementation. It has produced a culture which aggressively protects individualism and turf as opposed to stimulating creative thought, intellectual agility, and accountability. The

bureaucratic maze itself is largely responsible for the systemic inability to identify host nation outcome determinative problems and then create workable solutions for them.⁴⁸

PART C

AMERICA'S PROBLEM VS. SYMPTOM IDENTIFICATION SHORTFALL: TARGETING OLIGOPOLIES AND OLIGARCHIES, NOT IRRELEVANCIES

1. What Went Wrong

As discussed above, the primary reason American foreign policy has been unsuccessful in helping the Third World create pluralistic governments and open market economies resides in our own political leadership's inability or unwillingness to recognize that host nation oligarchies and oligopolies are primarily responsible for the deprivation and poverty we have allegedly been fighting.⁴⁹ Using America's limited foreign assistance resources to construct farm to market roads which wash away with the first rainy season, or school houses and medical treatment facilities which disappear shortly after they are built, adds very little to meaningfully help the disadvantaged.

Perhaps the best example of our government's inability to identify and treat host nation problems, as opposed to the symptoms of those problems, concerns the medical training exercises run throughout Latin America.⁵⁰ Here highly skilled and motivated Medical Corps personnel use medications to treat diarrhea. However, this palliative solves nothing. The problem -- polluted water, lack of adequate sanitation, and local inability to correct them, along with the empty plastic pill containers, all remain. Plus, the diarrhea comes back.

It is also important to point out that our armed forces' HCA efforts have produced many significant benefits for selected populations. But the return on our investment is incredibly limited. The program does not have a long run, enduring focus. Instead of using our limited resources to dispense pills, leaving the cause of the medical problem untreated, why not use these same funds to teach sanitation and simple medical treatments so that local citizens can improve their own situation?

2. Logical Solutions

The ineffective HCA practices discussed above have had the very real effect of intellectually and morally supporting the same repressive governments which kept their populations in poverty.⁵¹ Not only did our nation assistance efforts fail to improve things, they made us appear programmatically inept and politically duplicitous.⁵² We lose nothing by taking a new approach for effecting change.⁵³

To reverse these HCA shortcomings, America needs to abandon those programs which only provide temporary, non-systemic solutions to enduring problems. As defined above, isolated construction and service projects do not possess integrated long range support for economic and political evolution.

However, HCA educational, training, and intellectual initiatives help host nations target and steadily remove the causes of poverty, not just its symptoms. America can maximize its HCA return by teaching as opposed to performing; by providing leaders, builders, thinkers, and creators, as opposed to dollars. In

developing countries, thoughts, values, emotions, ideals, and the competency they produce flourish.⁵⁴ Anything else which cannot be structurally supported and maintained by the host nation, will eventually become inundated by the jungle, or stolen by those who can't afford to eat.

Much can also be accomplished by changing the vehicle of assistance. Government organizations, including the military, are large and expensive bureaucracies -- not more efficient and tailored educational, medical, or construction enterprises. Government resources should only be used when they are absolutely necessary -- when the abilities or resources required for legitimate and long range projects do not exist anywhere else.

Private, nongovernmental organizations and individuals can provide tremendously effective advice and guidance on how to build enduring agricultural, educational, manufacturing, and governing systems which local inhabitants can then construct, and thereafter take pride in. Once America begins furnishing only the skills necessary to teach host nation populations how to fix their own problems, will the problems themselves disappear, and along with them, the need for American foreign aid.

3. Placing the Oligopolies and Oligarchies in Context: Using the Elites to Work for Constructive Change

Enduring pluralistic advancement is not possible until the oligarchies and oligopolies which control poverty-ridden countries are undone. American political agendas must initially and specifically focus on host nation elitists if abiding and beneficial change is to occur.⁵⁵ If we do not help those in power

understand that they must change, and explain how change can be to their individual advantage, then economic improvement will remain centered in the hands of the already wealthy, and political amelioration will be stymied by the already corrupt.

America's philosophical approach here should be that as underdeveloped nations become more prosperous, the economic benefits enjoyed by those already established also grow, lawfully. As power is shared, the established political leaders take on new legitimate authority, which can be used to benefit the people and enhance the leaders' own prestige and influence.

It is important for rich and poor to internalize that power and wealth are legitimate goals of pluralistic governments and open market economies. The established will not suffer if the disenfranchised begin to benefit from enlightened government; in fact, the *rich will likely get richer*. The disenfranchised need not resent the affluent simply because they have already benefitted; the disenfranchised after all want nothing more than to become wealthy themselves. In Latin America, once the benefits are shared, old hostilities between the rich and poor will begin to decrease, and eventually be of only historic interest.

Hopefully, our country will be confident enough in its new approach to HCA that we will actively involve American and host nation media in what we are doing. Although there is always a risk of the media using our openness against us, they never believed that a prosperous society like the United States was in the business of "doing goodism"⁵⁶ for goodism's sake in any event.

Enlisting their support will help us convince unenlightened Latin American leaders that their historic techniques for obtaining and maintaining power will suffer the same fate as World Communism, and that the time for change is now, while they still have the capacity to benefit from the metamorphosis to come.

Current world events make the likelihood of this evolutionary comfortable vs. uncomfortable reduction more likely than ever. Latin American countries understand that no other world or regional power is now competing for their loyalty and support.⁵⁷ None is likely to care about or assist in their development. As a result, being economically and politically aligned with the United States will become more important to underprivileged countries, thereby increasing the prospect that American political and economic leadership in helping the elites share power and wealth will also be more successful now.

To facilitate these changes, American host nation support must include a mechanism for assisting the elites in sharing power and wealth. This mechanism could be American government representatives (AGR) placed in appropriate host nation economic and political entities for the sole purpose of explaining how our assistance can and should be used. The AGRs' role would be largely educational. They would help local military and civilian leaders understand the short and long range applications of American aid, and how to maximize its impact. Without the AGRs, even properly motivated local institutions will not have the sophistication and experience necessary to really help.

PART D

WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE AMERICAN MILITARY PLAY IN HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE MISSIONS?

1. America's Internal Economic Problems as they Affect Foreign Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs

Economic reality mandates that the United States define a new calculus for how to balance its foreign assistance and domestic budgets. While no credible call for isolationism and retrenchment currently exists, America must tailor its HCA expenditures to realistically attainable, affordable, and worthwhile national interest projects.

The new administration is rethinking everything our government spends significant sums of money on.⁵⁸ While they cut America's armed forces, they are also making the military a more significant HCA player. Such dual agendas raise questions about whether the military is being properly used as an economic and political tool, when by law and construct it is designed to be a national defense resource.

This conflict significantly impacts on our economy and every citizen. While thousands of Americans have lost their jobs, or are forced to work at less desirable ones,⁵⁹ the United States' military is constructing roads, bridges, hospitals, and schools in Latin American, precisely when there is a bottomless need for such development, and its attendant civilian jobs in virtually every section of this country.

The same result applies to America's health care.⁶⁰ Even though our medical expenses continue to increase beyond a growing

number of Americans' ability to pay, thousands of military doctors, dentists, veterinarians, medical services specialists, and nurses travel throughout the hemisphere dispensing temporal medical treatments to Third World populations who have chronic and systemic health problems these simple medications alone will never cure.

2. The Debate:

Should America's Military Significantly Participate In Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations?

Based on the political and economic questions raised above, it is clear that there are no easy answers to what role America's military should play in foreign assistance efforts. However, because men of good will and intellect are on both sides of the issue, it is important to set out each position.

a. Arguments Against Using our Military for Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Missions

Today's economic and political environment requires us to ask whether it is efficiently possible to accomplish both traditional and nontraditional military missions with diminishing personnel and economic resources. For example, when 20,000 soldiers a year deploy throughout United States Southern Command's area of operations, allegedly helping other countries build a better life for their citizens, what national defense or war related missions are being ignored by those soldiers, their units, and each level of military and civilian leadership?

The military's involvement in HCA projects also prevents national civilian leaders from thoroughly understanding where USAID and State Department organizational, agency, and personnel

weaknesses may reside. DoD's resource intensive ability to overcome civilian agency shortcomings makes measured and precise corrections to the civilian delivery of HCA benefits difficult at best. This result causes our bureaucracy to trudge along, continuing frustrating patterns of ineffective performance which cannot be economically corrected because no one really understands the total governmental process well enough to help.

Similarly, if the military continues its HCA missions, will it have to redirect doctrine writers away from developing how to fight and win on future, more complex battlefields, so they can concentrate on nation assistance missions?⁶¹ In an environment where the Army is losing manpower, and precious skills, it is difficult to imagine a realistic scenario where fewer people with less diverse abilities will be able to accomplish more. Logic demonstrates that in such an environment the opposite happens: less will be done less well.

Even more importantly, professional military leaders will pay morale and institutional prices for bifurcating our armed forces' responsibilities. The Army's culture and society, which is so vital to maintaining a "warrior" mentality, will begin to atrophy, and with it our ability to fight also deteriorates.⁶²

Soldiers engaged in HCA missions are practicing civilian skills while carrying needlessly expensive and restrictive military baggage. Building roads, schools, and hospitals are requirements for local civilian governments and private enterprise, not United States' military organizations. When host nation populations see

American soldiers trying to help improve their lives, they do not say, "Aren't those Americans wonderful?" They say, "What is wrong with my government; why can't it make my life better? Why can't it employ me or other members of my family so we can earn a living?"⁶³

As we all recognize, history has not stopped. Despots thrive in many parts of the world. As time goes on, they continue to measure the United States' abilities to counter their nefarious aspirations. Markedly diverting active or reserve component soldiers away from their war fighting duties to participate in HCA missions, significantly reduces national defense capabilities during a still dangerous period of international ethnic turmoil, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Such a result, in a very real sense, is short sighted and dangerous.⁶⁴

Yet enlightened political leaders like Sam Nunn have suggested that our military should play a role in fighting both domestic and international nontraditional military battles.

[A]t home we are still battling drugs, poverty, urban decay, lack of self-esteem, unemployment, and racism....I am convinced that there is a proper and important role the armed forces can play in addressing these pressing issues. I believe we can reinvigorate the military's spectrum of capabilities to address such needs as deteriorating infrastructure, the lack of role models for tens of thousands, if not millions of young people, limited training and educational opportunities for the disadvantaged, and serious health and nutrition problems facing many of our citizens, particularly children....During markup of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993, I intend to offer a proposal to authorize the Armed Forces to engage in appropriate community service programs.⁶⁵

It would be a mistake of historic proportions if partisan politics destroyed one of the world's most effective and still needed militaries simply because politicians required it to focus on fighting toxic waste, environmental spills, natural disasters, drug dealers, and Third World failures; while foreign hostile interests planned for, trained, and selectively executed military and terrorist missions we could no longer counter, except at greatly inflated and politically untenable human and financial costs.

The gravamen of this issue is not that the United States is about to be left undefended because we are providing humanitarian and civic assistance both here and abroad. The issue is that as America's armed forces move away from traditional military roles, to "softer" civilian activities, our readiness and the institutional machinery which maintains it become less combat oriented, and as a result, less effective."

At some point, the forces of evil will calculate that they can move against our interests because the resultant equation does not permit a politically supportable American decision to fight. If this were to happen, our worldwide political influence would be greatly reduced, and our national will for conducting whatever military response may be necessary would have gone with it.

**b. Arguments In Favor of Using the Army
for Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Missions**

Admiral Paul D. Miller, Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command, and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, believes⁶⁷ that today's American military is more than capable of performing both traditional and non-traditional missions. In fact, he argues in favor of re-engineering our armed forces for the post cold war world. Admiral Miller recognizes that his position is driven by both significant economic influences and the need to redefine what is required for global security.

As discussed above, in today's world, the evolving long term security environment centers first on economic concerns both at home and abroad. In America, we must grow into a highly flexible, lethal, and economical military, capable of performing more than combat operations in defense of our national security.⁶⁸ Abroad, we must abandon our cold war mentality, and recognize that international security is becoming an economic, capitalistic issue requiring fiscal and HCA support if it is to succeed. Even in the short term, a nation's economic strength will be more influential than its military power.⁶⁹

In support of this position, it can be argued that the cold war was not won by NATO's military forces, or by the innate benefits of democracy, but by America's efficient use of capitalistic policies which the Soviets were unable to match. If this argument is correct, then emerging nations will not necessarily be interested in our form of government, or our military's capability. Emerging leaders, even despots, will

eventually be more concerned with economic factors and capitalistic competition to maximize their own personal and national goals, than with armed confrontations or terrorism.

This is not to say that military power is irrelevant, particularly in the short run.⁷⁰ But it is to say that as we evolve beyond the cold war, military issues will become less important and international economic competition more important. Those in favor of maintaining or increasing our HCA responsibilities are in effect arguing for economic, political, social, and military balance, and against the cold war's myopic focus on military solutions.⁷¹ This is a revolutionary logical thought process. It is unfair and unrealistic to imagine that as a nation, or an international community, we can totally grasp its parameters now.

However, even Admiral Miller does not argue for making the United States the world's policeman, or totally dedicating ourselves to building Third World nations and fighting drug dealers. His strongest position is in favor of change so that we can maintain and enhance our world leadership role. Most importantly, Admiral Miller believes that the American people have already purchased the training and equipment necessary for this evolving mission.⁷²

To a large extent, the recent past supports Admiral Miller's position. One of the most celebrated units from Desert Storm was United States Army, Europe's VII Corps, a formation which had spent most of the cold war training to repulse the Soviet's in Germany,

at the Fulda Gap, in an environment entirely different from that it encountered while destroying Iraq's forces. In Somalia, a barren and hot desert climate, the Army sent its 10th Mountain Division (Light) to provide humanitarian and civic assistance. Again, an organization constructed and trained for vastly different circumstances, was efficiently deployed to an alien location for nontraditional, soft missions.

In both circumstances mentioned above, the American military demonstrated its remarkable flexibility, leadership, and farsighted planning. Fortunately, history has not asked us to test this model against a world class, well trained, astutely lead, and modernly equipped hostile military force. Irrespective of what we have accomplished in the Third World, militarily or peacefully, the challenge America's armed forces are solely and uniquely tasked to perform is national defense against all enemies, current and future, weak and strong, rational and irrational. In this final test, there is no room for failure.

c. Striking a Balance

Recent history, current domestic political issues, pressing international fiscal problems, existing regional ethnic conflicts, enduring Third World repression, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and even the President's 1993 National Security Strategy,⁷³ all demonstrate that the American government and the world community are in the process of evolving from a cold war mentality to a new world order. That process is going to take some time.

Significant questions like what role the United States' armed forces should play in resolving Third World poverty cannot be dispositively answered today. In fact, part of our national problem has been that we approach such perplexing long-term issues as if they were finitely answerable in the present. They are not! However, they are manageable if we have a single vision, effective organization, and a unified concept of how to employ that vision.

What our government can do today is set into motion a predictable planning process for providing nation assistance. This process would identify the American government agency permanently responsible for coordinating all future programs. At a minimum, its responsibilities should include:⁷⁴

(1) Objectively evaluating world events against our national interests to calculate when America's HCA involvement may be justified.

(2) Tailoring all mission resources including personnel, equipment, logistical and administrative support, supervisory agency presence, communication links, and organizational accountability government-wide.

(3) Uniformly ascertaining the host nation's actual problems (as opposed to symptoms), and determining what, if anything, we can do to help them fix what is wrong.

(4) Constructing an interagency coordinated effective plan aimed precisely at eradicating the host nation's problem, not placating politicians or treating symptoms.

(5) Insuring that the United States' role in addressing the identified problem is supportive of the host nation's efforts or desires. We can not act preemptively. America must only be available to help local governments solve their problems, not make those problems our own.

(6) Monitoring our involvement to determine if we are meeting previously established intermediate measures of success, while watching for signals illustrating that American involvement must be terminated or significantly altered.

If our government can view HCA as discussed above, questions concerning when and how the military should be involved will become more easily resolvable. A measured, thorough, and objective concept of how nation assistance activities should be conducted will, by definition, bring together the correct mix of military and civilian resources, responsibilities, and accountability.

In the end, deciding whether military resources will be used in HCA projects should be based on the unique facts and circumstances involved. Adopting an all or nothing approach to resolving America's economic, political, and military questions produces more problems than it solves. What America needs here is:

(1) Basic interagency bureaucratic coordination, flexibility, and intellectual agility;

(2) Protection of our military's unique war-fighting capabilities;

(3) Clear, legal authority which limits the armed forces to logistically and administratively supporting our civilian

agencies' HCA efforts, and then only when it is positively established that military assistance will not compromise our short or long run national defense capabilities;

(4) Continuation of traditional United States military to Latin American military programs of unit exchanges, mobile training teams, and subject matter expert exchanges which have proven their value in facilitating intergovernmental understanding, value transference, and confidence building;

(5) Creation of a new distinct government agency (making full use of separated military personnel and excess equipment) which would be responsible for implementing foreign policy initiatives like HCA projects, and resourced to operate independently or with minimal support from other agencies.

PART E

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is hard to overestimate the importance of the substantive concepts discussed here. Identifying and eliminating the causes of world poverty, and with it the privileged classes and repressive governments which enslave so much of our planet, portend improvements to the world society which cannot be envisioned now.

The difficulties and proposed solutions identified here recognize long standing power, turf, and resource battles which have been endemic to the world as we know it, and which have prevented pluralistic and enlightened governments from making the human contributions they have been capable of. However, my suggestions do recognize that emerging world changes and a new

American administration present us with opportunities to dramatically transform the way we have conducted international relations and domestic interagency business.

Most importantly, the possibilities suggested here are totally dependent on emerging new world order personalities -- those individuals who will lead us into the new millennium. If the next generation of leaders, my generation, is willing to abandon old ways of doing business, and their attendant stream of political undertows, and embark on a new adventure truly aimed at changing the world, and not just applying band-aids to open sores, then magnificent possibilities are open to us.

However, if all that has been presented here, or in other more enlightened expositions on change, is viewed through skeptical eyes, and parochial self-interests, then nothing grand is possible, and our generation will pass from the world scene having only contributed to the noise. But wouldn't it be nice, if in the years to come, the comfortable and the uncomfortable learned that approaching their problems together, in a measured and patient way, will benefit both sides -- that included in these benefits will be peace of mind, self respect, individual and national safety, increased health, and greater affluence for everyone -- and that all we need do for this to happen is sit together, abandon our fear of really understanding and seeing the other person's point of view, and then agreeing that the time has come to make a change?

As in many things, perhaps S.L.A. Marshall learned and appreciated all of this long before the rest of us. His view of

the future, codified shortly after World War II, still seems to be the clearest statement of what the United States and the potential for our future is about:

And so the final and greatest reality, that national strength lies only in the hearts and spirits of men. The Army, Navy, and Air Force are not the guardians of the national security. The tremendous problem of the future is beyond their capacity to solve....It carries into the halls of where our lawmakers may vote either to awaken our youth to a new understanding of duty or to continue the indulgent course which is more likely to find favor with the majority of their constituents.⁷⁵

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